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The California drug transparency bill (SB-17), signed into law
in October 2017, seeks to promote transparency in pharmaceutical
pricing, enhance understanding about pharmaceutical pricing trends,
and assist in managing pharmaceutical costs. This article examines the
legal and regulatory aspects of SB-17, explores legal challenges to the law,
compares it to other state efforts to address rising drug prices, and
discusses how California can maximize the impact of SB-17 by coupling
the law with other incentives. While SB-17 might not significantly reduce
drug prices, the new law represents a meaningful step for one state
seeking to negotiate the political and legal boundaries of state action to
rein in drug prices.
ABSTRACT

P

rescription drug spending per capita is far higher in the United States
than in other high-income countries, exceeding $1,000 per person
in 2016.1 The rate of spending
growth for retail prescription drugs has declined
significantly (from 8.9 percent in 2015 to 1.3 percent in 2016),2 but prescription drug costs remain a financial burden for many people. In a
2016 national survey, 20 percent of adults reported that they had not filled a drug prescription in the past year because of cost.3 Moreover,
for many people, price shopping for prescription
drugs remains a challenge.4,5 In a 2017 poll, voters ranked prescription drug prices and out-ofpocket spending as far more important than any
other health policy issue, including fixing the
Affordable Care Act.6
Following the recent outcry about the affordability of prescription drugs, Congress has held
hearings7 and introduced bills8–10 attempting to
make prescription drugs more affordable—with
negligible success. In response, many state legislatures have taken up the mantle of controlling
prescription drug spending. In 2018, forty-four
states introduced and twenty-nine states passed
legislation designed to increase the accessibility
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and affordability of prescription medications.11
States have sought to increase price transparency, prevent “excessive” price increases, regulate
pharmacy benefit managers, and allow drug
importation from Canada.11 Fulfilling its role
as an innovator state, California has led the
way toward price transparency. In October 2017
Gov. Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 17 (SB-17),
a bill that seeks to improve drug price transparency and improve price negotiations by requiring specific disclosures from pharmaceutical
manufacturers and health insurers.
In the absence of federal action, states have
recently proposed an array of methods to regulate drug prices, but the boundaries of state
power to regulate pharmaceutical prices remain
vague. In addition, any state that passes new
legislation should expect a formidable legal challenge from the pharmaceutical industry. In a
setback for states hoping to address rising drug
prices, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals declared a Maryland law prohibiting price gouging
for generic medications12 unconstitutional because it violated the dormant commerce clause,
which bans states from unduly burdening interstate commerce.13 In light of that ruling and the
uncertainty about the limits of state action, the
September 2018

Downloaded from HealthAffairs.org on June 10, 2019.
Copyright Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.
For personal use only. All rights reserved. Reuse permissions at HealthAffairs.org.

37 :9

Jaime S. King (kingja@
uchastings.edu) is a professor
of law at the University of
California Hastings College of
the Law and executive editor
of the Source on Healthcare
Price and Competition.

Health A ffairs

1503

Pharmaceuticals

&

Medical Technology
precedents that will be set in legal challenges to
SB-17 may help resolve questions about states’
power and serve as a foundation for other states
looking to pass meaningful legislation to address
rising drug costs. This commentary examines
the provisions of SB-17, discusses the potential
legal challenges to it, and finds that SB-17, while
carefully crafted to avoid many preemption issues, may have limited impact unless it is coupled with other policies.

used to determine the wholesale acquisition
cost, and marketing materials. However, the
law limits disclosure requirements to information already in the public domain, which provides little additional transparency.
Overall, these provisions will provide policy
makers with information that might otherwise
be difficult to collect and aggregate. However,
their real value lies in their ability to help shape
the scope of state legal boundaries surrounding
drug pricing reform.

Requiring Pricing Disclosure
To promote transparency in pharmaceutical
pricing, enhance understanding about pricing
trends, and assist payers in the management
of pharmaceutical costs, SB-17 requires insurers
and manufacturers to disclose information on
several aspects of pricing. Companies that fail
to comply face civil penalties.
Disclosures By Insurers Health plans that
file annual rate information with the California
Department of Managed Health Care or Department of Insurance must submit an additional
annual report that names the twenty-five most
frequently prescribed drugs, the twenty-five
most costly drugs in terms of total annual spending, and the twenty-five drugs with the greatest
increase in total annual spending.14 In addition,
large employer group plans must specify the portion of premiums attributable to prescription
drugs and designate the proportion of any premium increase due to prescription costs versus
other sources (for example, inpatient care, outpatient care, and physician services). SB-17 also
requires these two departments to report aggregated information to state legislators and the
public and to hold public meetings to discuss
their findings. However, with the exception of
reported aggregated information, the agencies
must keep SB-17 disclosures confidential.
Disclosures By Manufacturers SB-17 requires pharmaceutical manufacturers to notify
purchasers at least sixty days before any price
increase that exceeds 16 percent over a two-year
period for all drugs with a wholesale acquisition
cost greater than $40.15 Federal law defines
this cost as the manufacturer’s list price for
the drug to wholesalers or direct purchasers in
the United States, not including rebates or other
discounts.16 In addition, manufacturers must
notify the California Office of Statewide Health
Planning and Development about any newly
marketed pharmaceutical with a wholesale acquisition cost above the threshold of a specialty
drug under Medicare Part D (more than $670 per
month).17 Manufacturers must also provide the
office with information on the drug’s usage (for
example, indication and dosage), the factors
1504
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Challenges In State Regulation Of
Drug Prices
The pharmaceutical industry has consistently
challenged states’ attempts to promote price
transparency and regulate price increases. In
fact, the contours of SB-17 appear designed to
avoid pitfalls encountered by other states in their
attempts to constrain drug prices, including preemption by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 and violations
of trade-secret laws.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act
Preemption ERISA creates significant barriers
to state health reform efforts that affect employee benefit plans, including prescription drug
coverage.With the goal of establishing uniformity across states, ERISA establishes minimum
standards for employee pension and benefit
plans and preempts the ability of states to pass
laws that “relate to” employee benefit plans.18
While ERISA exempts state insurance regulations from this preemption, it does not deem
self-insured employer benefits to be insurance,
and therefore it preempts any state attempt to
pass legislation that relates to self-insured employer plans—which cover approximately 60 percent of Americans with employer-sponsored insurance.19,20
As a result, ERISA has had severe consequences for states’ attempts to control health care costs
and improve price transparency. In 2016 the US
Supreme Court ruled in Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co. that Vermont could not require selfinsured employers to report their health care
claims data to the state all-payer claims database,
because such reporting impermissibly intrudes
on central matters of ERISA plan administration.21 Indeed, citing Gobeille, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that ERISA preempted
the application of an Iowa law—which required
pharmacy benefit managers to disclose how they
priced generic medications to the state insurance commissioner—from applying to managers
that served ERISA plans.22 As a result, ERISA has
become a powerful barrier to several forms of
health care price transparency legislation, be-
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cause states must choose between passing laws
that will not benefit a large section of the population (those with self-insured employer-based
coverage) and risking being dragged through
an uncertain, and currently unfavorable, legal
battle over the scope of ERISA preemption.23
SB-17 attempts to avoid ERISA preemption by
requiring disclosures only from plans regulated
by the Department of Managed Health Care or
the Department of Insurance, which includes
large and small employer group plans but not
plans of self-insured employers. As a result, lawmakers will not have pharmaceutical spending
data for the employees of some of the largest
employers in the state when considering other
measures to address drug prices.
Trade Secrets The pharmaceutical industry
has also challenged states’ efforts to increase
price transparency for violating federal and state
trade-secret laws.24 In 2017 Nevada passed Senate Bill 539, which required manufacturers of
“essential” diabetes drugs to provide information to the state that included the costs of
manufacturing and marketing the drugs and
the amount of profits attributed to them. In addition, if a manufacturer increases the wholesale
acquisition cost by more than the rate of medical
inflation, it must provide the Nevada Department of Health and Human Services with an
explanation of the factors that contributed to
the increase and the percentage of the total increase in price that is attributable to each factor.
Nevada’s law also amended the state’s definition
of a trade secret to specifically exclude any information that the law requires, so that the state can
publish the information. Following a civil suit,24
however, filed by the trade organizations that
represent the interests of pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies—Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
and Biotechnology Innovation Organization

(BIO)—Nevada’s Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations that allow pharmaceutical manufacturers or pharmacy benefit
managers to request confidentiality of the information submitted to the state.25 The state will
keep confidential any information it reasonably
considers to meet the standards of a trade secret
under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act of
2016 (18 US Code, section 1836) or Exemption
4 of the federal Freedom of Information Act
[5 US Code, section 552(b)(4)].
In contrast to the Nevada law, SB-17 attempts
to avoid violating trade-secrets protections by
limiting required disclosures to publicly available information or requiring disclosures to
agencies (such as the Office of Statewide Health
Planning and Development) that must keep the
information confidential. While the wholesale
acquisition cost is publicly available, it remains
unclear whether advance notification of an impending increase above a threshold—such as
that required by SB-17—constitutes a trade
secret.

Challenges To SB-17
Unlike legislation in other states, SB-17 does not
specifically limit price increases or allow state
officials to intervene if they believe a manufacturer has engaged in price gouging. At the most
fundamental level, SB-17 simply requires drug
manufacturers to provide both advance warning
of price increases above a threshold and detailed
information about newly marketed specialty
drugs. Nonetheless, in December 2017 PhRMA
filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern
District of California, challenging SB-17 for violating the dormant commerce clause and the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.26
Dormant Commerce Clause The Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, and the dormant commerce
clause is a long-standing judicial interpretation
that prohibits states from passing laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce without sufficient offsetting
local benefits.27 In Healy v. Beer Institute the Supreme Court held that the externality principle
of the dormant commerce clause forbids states
from directly regulating commerce that occurs
outside of the regulating state, “regardless of
whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was
intended by the legislature.”28
PhRMA alleges that SB-17 violates the dormant
commerce clause because it requires advance
notice of increases to the wholesale acquisition
cost, thereby delaying price increases in external
markets. Under SB-17 a manufacturer cannot
increase the wholesale acquisition cost without
September 2018
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waiting sixty days or facing financial penalities.26
Therefore, because contract prices with wholesalers, hospitals, pharmacies, pharmacy benefit
managers, payers, and others are typically based
on the wholesale acquisition cost, PhRMA asserts that SB-17 becomes an unconstitutional
nationwide ban on price increases for certain
drugs, unless the State of California receives
sixty-day advance notification.26
Until recently, many courts narrowly interpreted the externality principle to strike down
only laws that controlled prices or required
price affirmation, linked in-state prices to those
charged elsewhere, or raised costs for outof-state consumers or rival businesses.29 In
April 2018, however, a three-judge panel of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the
principle more broadly to find that Maryland’s
law prohibiting price gouging for essential offpatent or generic drugs12 violated the dormant
commerce clause. The court held that because
the law applied to drugs “made available for sale
within the state,” it could apply to drugs that
were never actually sold in Maryland. The court
reasoned that the law is “effectively a price control statute that instructs manufacturers and
wholesale distributors as to the prices they are
permitted to charge in transactions that do not
take place in Maryland.”13 In July 2018 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals denied the state’s petition to have the case reheard by the entire court,
but Judge Wynn issued a dissent,30 likely setting
up an appeal to the Supreme Court.
In contrast to Maryland’s anti–price gouging
law,12 SB-17 requires only advance notice of price
increases and allows increases of any size (with
proper notification). Furthermore, significant
legal uncertainty surrounds the interpretation
of the dormant commerce clause, and a decision
by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on the
Maryland law is not binding on the PhRMA case
against SB-17 in the District Court for the Eastern
District of California. Given these realities, it is
not clear how the District Court will rule. Nonetheless, the District Court’s decision on SB-17
will likely have significant implications for other
challenges to drug pricing legislation.
Free Speech And Due Process In addition to
its dormant commerce clause claim, PhRMA argues that SB-17 violates pharmaceutical manufacturers’ First Amendment right to free speech
and their Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process.26 PhRMA alleges that SB-17 violates the
First Amendment when it singles out manufacturers as the only entity that must give advance
notice of pharmaceutical price increases, when
other entities, such as pharmacy benefit managers, also affect prices. PhRMA also argues that
SB-17 unnecessarily requires manufacturers to
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justify a price increase using only two potential
justifications: a “change or improvement” in the
drug. The law does not consider other typical
justifications for price increases (such as raising
capital for research or providing increasing value
to the health system by decreasing overall spending), which essentially forces manufacturers to
provide a false reason or abstain from answering
the question. Finally, PhRMA claims that SB-17
violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it does not specify whether
wholesale acquisition cost increases before January 1, 2018, would trigger SB-17’s reporting
requirements—which would make the law retroactive.26 While California could remedy this potential violation by considering only prospective
price increases, the state appears poised to apply
the requirement retrospectively, pending a ruling in PhRMA’s lawsuit.
To pass effective legislation, state lawmakers
need clear signals from the courts regarding the
boundaries of state regulation of all health care
prices, including pharmaceutical prices. Thus,
SB-17 represents an important effort by a state
looking to pass meaningful legislation that will
withstand legal challenges by the pharmaceutical industry and help define the contours of permissible state action. Nonetheless, SB-17 will
have minimal impact unless the state takes additional measures to address rising drug prices.

Implications Of SB-17 For Drug
Pricing
Shortly after its passage, SB-17 was dubbed “the
nation’s most comprehensive law aimed at shining a light on prescription drug prices.”31 While
the law makes significant strides, the crafting of
SB-17 to avoid preemption pitfalls constrains its
reach in several ways. Indeed, SB-17 may have
unintended consequences, including speculation in the pharmaceutical supply chain, price
collusion, and artificial shortages.
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Unintended Consequences First, the law will
do little to directly reduce drug prices overall,
because pharmaceutical manufacturers can
spread price increases out across drug categories
and adjust rebates to maintain profits. The law
relies on the wholesale acquisition cost to avoid
trade-secret issues, but as a result, it does not
include information on confidential rebates and
price discounts provided to pharmacy benefit
managers, which often dramatically alter the actual prices. SB-17 thus leaves open several avenues for price manipulation.
Second, SB-17’s advance notice requirement
provides useful information for direct purchasers, policy makers, and insurers, but it also creates opportunities for market manipulation. For
instance, it gives drug manufacturers the opportunity to raise their prices in concert. If a manufacturer of a competing drug receives advance
notice of a competitor’s price increase, it could
commensurately increase the price of its drug
with minimal risk of losing sales to the competition.32,33 In turn, SB-17 could allow competing
firms to signal their intent to increase prices,
which could lead to tacit price collusion.
Third, SB-17 encourages pharmacies to stockpile drugs when they receive notice of a pending
price increase.34 Distribution service agreements
between manufacturers and wholesalers generally limit the amount of inventory that a wholesaler can hold, but pharmacies are not typically
bound by similar contracts. As a result, when
pharmacies—especially those affiliated with or
owned by a pharmacy benefit manager or an
insurer—receive sixty days’ advance notice, they
can purchase extra inventory at the lower price
but sell at a higher price later.34 Such stockpiling

can create artificial shortages for pharmacies
that do not receive advance notice. The pending
merger between Aetna, an insurer, and CVS
Health, a pharmacy group with an embedded
pharmacy benefit manager, may exacerbate such
effects.
Multiple Strategies Needed Despite the potential for unintended consequences and other
limitations in SB-17, the law represents a meaningful initial step in determining what power
states have to address the affordability of prescription drugs. Transparency alone, however,
is insufficient to encourage patients to priceshop. Research on online price transparency initiatives finds only modest changes in patient
behavior,35,36 but combining price transparency
with targeted consumer incentives can lead to
widespread price-shopping.37 Augmenting price
transparency information with a tangible financial incentive, such as reference pricing, has
been found to be effective in reducing pharmaceutical spending and is a viable next step in drug
pricing policy.38

Conclusion
California’s SB-17 constitutes a critical part of a
movement by states to reduce pharmaceutical
prices and clarify the scope of states’ power to
address health care prices more generally. Although it is innovative, SB-17 is unlikely to have
a significant impact on drug spending without
additional incentives for consumers to use lower-priced drugs. Nonetheless, the law remains a
vital step in defining state authority and reflects
California’s status as a leader among states looking to control prescription drug prices. ▪
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